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1  Introduction
An important part of intellectual property scholarship involves discussion 
about the interaction of intellectual property law with the notion of the public 
domain or intellectual commons. This important debate has been driven by 
concerns that intellectual property law (particularly in American law) may be 
extending its reach to include new types of intellectual activity as well as by 
extending existing intellectual property rights.1 This article does not purport 
to question the legitimacy of the intellectual property system as a whole, but 
merely to note some aspects of the commons which have to be considered 
while revising or developing any areas of South African intellectual property 
law.2 Three important questions need to be addressed in this regard. Firstly, 
* The South African Research Chair in Property Law is hosted by Stellenbosch University, funded by the 
Department of Science and Technology and administered by the National Research Foundation
1 F Macmillan “Altering the Contours of the Public Domain” in C Waelde & H MacQueen (eds) Intellectual 
Property: The Many Faces of the Public Domain (2007) 98 98-99  Also see Eldred v Ashcroft 123 S 
Ct 769 (2003) (United States of America case upholding the constitutional validity of the copyright 
term extension); PH Haggerty “Comment: The Constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998” (2002) 70 U Cin L Rev 651; B Depoorter “The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: 
The Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual Property Law” (2004) 9 V JL & Tech 4  Also see the recent 
United States Court of Appeals case which allowed a patent over certain DNA molecules that do not 
exist in nature: Association for Molecular Pathology v United States PTO 2011 US App LEXIS 15649; 
99 USPQ2D (BNA) 1398  Comparative law is becoming increasingly important and it would be natural 
for South African courts and legislators to look to American law for guidance on developing intellectual 
property law, since America is viewed as a leader in the field of intellectual property  For this reason 
it is also necessary to consider the undesirable developments in order to avoid the same pitfalls while 
developing South African intellectual property law
2 Intellectual property law may be classified into broad categories, notably copyright, patents, trademarks, 
industrial designs and trade secrets  In South African law, they receive sui generis protection in the 
form of property rule-type protection  Private law honours this position and as such intellectual property 
rights are considered property rights in private law, even though the rights and remedies are provided 
for in specific legislation  W Cornish & D Llewelyn Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade 
Marks and Allied Rights 6 ed (2007) 6 state that “[i]ntellectual property protects applications of ideas 
and information that are of commercial value … One characteristic shared by all types of [intellectual 
property rights] is that they are essentially negative: they are rights to stop others doing certain things – 
rights, in other words, to stop pirates, counterfeiters, imitators and even in some cases third parties who 
have independently reached the same ideas, from exploiting them without the license of the right-owner”  
They also explain that while creators do not need an intellectual property right to exploit the creation, it 
is also true that an intellectual property right does not entitle the right-owner to ignore the rights of other 
individuals or public liabilities
       
where did the notion of a commons originate and how is it applicable to 
intellectual products? Secondly, what exactly is the commons (or the public 
domain, as it is more often termed when referring to intellectual products)? 
Finally, how could the idea of the intellectual commons develop further?
The concept of the public domain in intellectual space depends profoundly 
on Roman law concepts that govern physical space. These concepts 
acknowledged different non-exclusive, but not necessarily public, uses of 
property. The concepts of res communes3 and res publicae4 have been used 
most often in the debate about intellectual property and the public domain.5 
The notion of res communes refers to things that are by their nature incapable 
of being owned, while the notion of res publicae refers to things that are open 
to the public due to the working of a law even though their nature allows them 
to be appropriated.6 These Roman law concepts have been translated into the 
modern concepts of the commons and the public domain in the current debate 
about intellectual property, but the two original concepts are often confused 
or used interchangeably, which has not helped to simplify the interaction 
between intellectual property law and the notion of intellectual public space.7
Intellectual property law excludes certain parts of intellectual space from 
being exclusively owned; and in doing so acknowledges the importance of 
the commons.8 It is not always clear whether these parts are excluded because 
they are incapable of being owned by virtue of their legal nature9 or whether 
they should be kept in the public domain as a matter of policy.10 For example, 
certain innovations are not patentable since they are excluded by statute. 
Examples would be discoveries and scientific theories.11 Copyright12 does 
not protect ideas (which should remain in the commons), but the distinction 
3 CM Rose “Romans, Roads and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age” 
(2003) 66 Law & Contemp Probs 89 93-96
4 96-100
5 Macmillan “Altering the Contours of the Public Domain” in Intellectual Property 99-100
6 Macmillan “Altering the Contours of the Public Domain” in Intellectual Property 99-100  See Rose 
(2003) Law & Contemp Probs 93-100
7 Macmillan “Altering the Contours of the Public Domain” in Intellectual Property 99-100  See Rose 
(2003) Law & Contemp Probs 93-105
8 Macmillan “Altering the Contours of the Public Domain” in Intellectual Property 100-101
9 This relates to what Gray would refer to as legal non-excludability: K Gray “Property in Thin Air” (1991) 
50 Cambridge LJ 252 273-274
10 Gray terms this moral non-excludability: Gray (1991) Cambridge LJ 280-283
11 Macmillan “Altering the Contours of the Public Domain” in Intellectual Property 101  S 25(2) of the 
Patents Act names specific exclusions from the concept of an invention for purposes of patents, namely 
a discovery; a scientific theory; a mathematical method; a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or 
any other aesthetic work; a scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act, playing a game or doing 
business; a program for a computer; or the presentation of information  See s 25(2)(a)-(g) of the Patents 
Act 57 of 1978  Also see TD Burrell Burrell’s South African Patent and Design Law 3 ed (1999) 1-24; A 
van der Merwe “The Law of Patents” in HB Klopper, T Pistorius, B Rutherford, L Tong, P van der Spuy & 
A van der Merwe (co-ordinating ed) Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2011) 271-276  S 25(4) 
of the Patents Act names further exclusions from patentability, namely inventions that promote offensive 
or immoral behaviour; and any variety of animal or plant, or any essentially biological process for the 
production of animals or plants that is not a microbiological process
12 OH Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law (RS 14 2012) 1-1 describes copyright as “the 
exclusive right in relation to work embodying intellectual content (i e  the product of the intellect) to do 
or authorise others to do certain acts in relation to that work, which represents in the case of each type of 
work the manners in which that work can be exploited for personal gain or profit”  The essential object of 
copyright law is to grant the essential right to control the use of the work fully
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between unprotected ideas and protected expressions is vague and not always 
applied consistently by the courts.13 Copyright also prevents exclusive control 
over certain rights in the case of the exceptions.14 These two examples from 
copyright law also demonstrate how it is difficult to pinpoint why a particular 
aspect of intellectual work should be excluded from exclusive ownership. The 
reason why certain aspects are excluded from private ownership pertains to 
their nature, but the issue is also regulated by statutes and this increases the 
confusion.
Two major problems may arise when attempting to justify the recognition 
and protection of intellectual property, namely the nonexclusive character 
of intellectual property and its possible restriction of the free flow of 
information15 (not necessarily in the sense that the information is not made 
available, but that it is not always permitted to be used in future innovations). 
Hettinger explains the nonexclusive characteristic of intellectual property 
subject matter as follows:
“These objects are nonexclusive: they can be at many places at once and are not consumed by their 
use. The marginal cost of providing an intellectual object to an additional user is zero, and though 
there are communications costs, modern technologies can easily make an intellectual property object 
unlimitedly available at very low cost.”16
The nonexclusive character of intellectual property constitutes an example 
of what Gray would refer to as a physically non-excludable resource.17 
However, the physical non-exclusivity of intellectual property does not imply 
legal non-exclusivity – the intellectual product may still be legally excludable 
when legislation enables the creator of the intellectual product to protect the 
creation. If the protection granted by legislation is not utilised, the intellectual 
creation would also be legally non-excludable and no property protection 
would be afforded.
The sharing of intellectual property objects does not prevent or impair 
personal use by its creator, but prevents the creator from exclusively selling 
these intellectual objects to other persons.18 For example, the author of a book 
may provide a copy of such book to his friend (who may read the book and 
is entitled to certain fair uses of the book), but still be able to read his copy 
of the book (and in this sense the use is not exclusive). However, only the 
author has the exclusive right to make further copies of the book and sell such 
copies. The primary question which a justification of intellectual property 
13 Macmillan “Altering the Contours of the Public Domain” in Intellectual Property 101  Although 
Macmillan bases this statement on United States law, examples of its truth may also be found in South 
African law  See T Pistorius “Copyright Law” in HB Klopper, T Pistorius, B Rutherford, L Tong, P van 
der Spuy & A van der Merwe (co-ordinating ed) Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2011) 146-
147; Peter-Ross v Ramesar 2008 BIP 306 (C); W Alberts “Copyright in Ideas” (2008) 16 Juta’s Business 
Law 48-50; Dean Copyright Law 1-25–1-27
14 S 12(1) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 provides for the fair dealing exception  Further exceptions are 
s 12(3) (quotations), s 12(4) (illustrations for teaching), s 12(5) (ephemeral copies) and s 15(3) (reverse 
engineering of products)  See Dean Copyright Law 1-92–1-109; Pistorius “Copyright Law” in Law of 
Intellectual Property in South Africa 211-222 on all the exceptions to copyright infringement
15 EC Hettinger “Justifying Intellectual Property” (1989) 18 Phil & Pub Affairs 31 34-35
16 34
17 Gray (1991) Cambridge LJ 269-273
18 Hettinger (1989) Phil & Pub Affairs 34-35
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needs to address is why one person should have the “exclusive right to possess 
and use something which all people could possess and use concurrently”.19 
In the case of a physical object, its exclusive use may be justified where such 
exclusion is necessary for the person’s own use, but no such justification is 
available in the context of intellectual property.20 However, in the context of 
intellectual property rights it is not the exclusive use right that constitutes the 
core property right, but rather the right to reproduce and sell the intellectual 
product. The nonexclusive feature of intellectual products is very important in 
the process of finding a balance between the correct level of incentive (in the 
form of property rule type protection) for continued production of intellectual 
products and the importance of preserving and promoting an intellectual 
commons so that the free flow of information is not stifled. Society places 
a fundamental value on freedom of expression and thought. Where private 
property protection is granted, one person’s freedom is improved to the 
detriment of all other persons’ freedom.21 The restrictions on the free flow 
of information that may result from granting of intellectual property rights 
may stifle individual growth and impede the general advancement of new 
technologies and knowledge.22 This is ironic, since the incentive theory is 
most often used to justify intellectual property,23 but in fact the way in which 
intellectual property is developing (in the United States of America) creates 
the risk that it will have the opposite effect. South African law should take this 
into account while reviewing and developing intellectual property legislation 
in order to find the correct balance between incentives via intellectual property 
rights; and the public’s right to access information. When the negative 
consequences that intellectual property rights may have are taken into 
account, it becomes harder to justify stronger intellectual property rights, as 
it becomes more important to protect and promote the intellectual commons.
Aside from the incentive theory that is generally used to argue in favour 
of robust intellectual property rights, the economic theory is also a firm 
favourite. Boyle explains the basic economic theory as applied to intellectual 
property as follows:
“Information is a public good, non-excludable and non-rival. It is hard to stop one unit from satisfying 
an infinite number of users at zero or close to zero marginal cost. Under such conditions, producers 
of information and information goods will have inadequate incentives, leading to under-production. 
If I could create a useful digital restaurant guide at great expense but can sell only one copy before 
my whole market disappears, then I will hardly make the effort in the first place. The solution to this 
public goods problem is intellectual property. By creating a limited monopoly called an intellectual 
property right, we can give producers an adequate incentive to create.”24
He states that this argument has been used to expand the reach of intellectual 
property. Especially in the area of the internet it is argued that the goods 
19 35
20 35
21 35
22 36
23 47
24 J Boyle “Symposium: Taking Stock: The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property Rights: Cruel, 
Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property” (2000) 53 
Vand L Rev 2007 2012
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become even less rivalrous and less excludable and for this reason intellectual 
property protection should be stronger. However, since an intellectual 
property right entails a monopoly and in economic terms monopolies may 
be seen as imposing losses, this argument in favour of stronger intellectual 
property protection is not so straightforward.25 The format of this article does 
not allow a full discussion of the property theories utilised for the justification 
of intellectual property rights and the criticisms levelled against them. It 
suffices to say that there are serious questions regarding reliance on these 
theories to argue for the expansion of intellectual property rights, with the 
most important for purposes of this article being that these new (or stronger) 
rights encroach upon the intellectual commons.
Before discussing the intellectual commons or public domain any further, 
it is necessary to briefly discuss the commons in the context of tangible 
resources and particularly land, since this is where the current debate about 
how and why the commons should be protected originated. Thereafter it is 
possible to discuss the way that the concept of the commons may relate to 
intellectual property.
2  The development of the notion of the commons
In his 1968 article on the commons,26 Hardin (a natural scientist) explains 
that the population-growth problem is resulting in the destruction of the 
commons. His article refers to the tangible commons of land, water and 
other natural resources. He proposes that there is no technical solution to the 
population problem, but that the solution lies in a fundamental extension in 
morality. Regarding the commons, he explains that the commons is being 
over-used and destroyed. Because of population growth, the commons will no 
longer be able to accommodate the needs of all entities. The commons is being 
eroded by persons taking from the commons, for example herdsmen grazing 
cattle on a common pasture. The commons is also being destroyed by people 
putting things into it, for example pollution into a river. Hardin proposes 
different ways in which the population growth may be regulated in order 
to spare the commons. However, he does not make use of the usual private 
property arguments to facilitate the conservation of the commons, but instead 
refers to wealth maximisation and morality.27 Although there are obvious 
differences between the commons of land and the commons of intellectual 
property, it is possible that the intellectual commons may be depleted because 
25 2012-2013  See S Ghosh “Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly, Deregulation, and Intellectual 
Property” (2008) 2008 U Ill LR 1125 1138-1139:
“A natural monopoly arises when the average costs of producing a product or service declines as more of 
the product or service is supplied to the market  Because of declining average costs, it is more efficient 
from the perspective of lowering the average cost of production to have one firm service the market 
rather than duplicate expenditures  Average costs are falling either because there are huge fixed costs to 
production or because the costs of producing an additional unit of the product or service are negligible ”
 See also SV Berg & J Tschirhart Natural Monopoly Regulation: Principles and Practice (1988) 12-24; DF 
Spulber Regulation and Markets (1989) 513-514; S Ghosh “The Intellectual Property Incentive: Not so 
Natural as to Warrant Strong Exclusivity” (2006) 3 SCRIPT-ed 97 101
26 G Hardin “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) 162 Science 1243  
27 1243-1248
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of enclosure, in the same way as the commons of land.28 Unlike land, it is 
actually possible to increase intellectual products, but this can only be done if 
a healthy intellectual commons remains intact for future uses in intellectual 
innovations. The trick is to provide enough intellectual property rights to 
ensure a continued incentive to create new products, but also ensuring that 
enough remains or is returned to the commons to have enough “raw material” 
available for creation. The intellectual products should also revert back into 
the commons for future creative use after a reasonable time.
In an article that interacts with Hardin’s notions of the “tragedy of the 
commons”, Ghosh suggests that Hardin’s solution of morality does not 
exclude the solution that property rights can provide, which is also a particular 
type of “social arrangement”.29 This morality approach may be the answer 
to the question of how the notions of distributive justice should influence the 
way intellectual property law manages the intellectual commons. However, 
one must distinguish intellectual property from tangible property, which 
is the subject of Hardin’s30 article. Use of the tangible property commons, 
through actions such as grazing and polluting, can lead to the commons being 
overused. In the case of intellectual property, on the other hand, use of the 
commons entails creative and innovative processes that may in fact expand 
the commons instead of overusing it.31 This assumes that the resource remains 
in the commons after it is used in the creation of an intellectual property work 
and is not propertised and consequently removed from the commons. Ghosh 
further defines “distributive justice” simply as the way in which resources 
should be allocated among individuals in society, since he finds Hardin’s 
notion of distributive justice (or morality, as Hardin terms it) strained.
Ghosh questions the reasons why the metaphor of the commons is so 
important in intellectual property debates when the rationale of intellectual 
property differs so radically from the concept of the “tragedy of the commons” 
(as borrowed from Hardin). A revision of the notion of the commons is 
necessary in order to afford room for the rationale behind intellectual 
property.32 Rose describes the “tragedy of the commons” as follows:
“When things are left open to the public, they are thought to be wasted by overuse or underuse. No 
one wishes to invest in something that may be taken from him tomorrow, and no one knows whom to 
approach to make exchanges. All resort to snatching up what is available for ‘capture’ today, leaving 
behind a wasteland. From this perspective, ‘public property’ is an oxymoron: things left open to the 
public are not property at all, but rather its antithesis.”33
28 J Boyle “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain” (2003) 66 Law 
& Contemp Probs 33 33-36  Also see J Boyle The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind 
(2008) 42-53; T More Utopia (1947) 32; JA Yelling Common Field and Enclosure in England, 1450-1850 
(1977)  Compare M Rose “The Public Domain: Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates 
and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain” (2003) 66 L & Contemp Prob 75
29 S Ghosh “The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the Construction of Intellectual Property Markets” 
(2007) 40 UC Davis L Rev 855 857
30 Hardin (1968) Science 1243-1248
31 Ghosh (2007) UC Davis L Rev 857-861
32 858-861
33 CM Rose “The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property” (1986) 
53 U Chi L Rev 711 712  Also see CF Runge & E Defrancesco “Exclusion, Inclusion, and Enclosure: 
Historical Commons and Modern Intellectual Property” (2006) 34 World Development 1713 1714-1717
36 STELL LR 2013 1
       
The modern doctrines do not explain why and under which circumstances 
property rights may appear to vest in the public at large or what Rose calls 
the “unorganised public”.34 Instead, she turns to the older doctrines of “public 
trust”, “prescription” and “custom” in order to find insights into the nature of 
“inherently public property”. She notes:
“[S]ervice to commerce was a central factor in defining as ‘public’ such roads and waterways. Used 
in commerce, some property had qualities akin to infinite ‘returns to scale’. Consequently, here the 
commons was not tragic, but comedic, in the classical sense of a story with a happy outcome.”35
This is the case not only because the commons may infinitely expand 
wealth, but also because it could socialise the members of an otherwise 
atomised society. In essence, inherently public property may be described 
as resources of which the value is increased by open use, in contrast to the 
“tragedy of the commons”, where open use destroys the value of the resource. 
For inherently public property the threat of destruction lies in the possibility 
of a monopoly over these resources rather than in open use.36
John Locke37 justified property on the basis that every person has a property 
in his own person and also his own labour and works created with his labour. 
However, what is commonly overlooked is the way in which his theories also 
justify the existence of the commons. The basic idea of Locke’s proposition 
is that by “mixing” one’s labour with land or other tangible property, one 
acquires a “natural right” to the property.38 This principle that a person should 
have property in that which he has created by his own intellectual effort and 
exertion played a large role in the recognition of intellectual property rights.39 
The problem that Locke attempted to address was that the earth belonged to 
“Mankind in common”,40 which raises the question how individuals could 
have property in things. Since natural law proclaimed the existence of a 
commons, it was problematic for the same natural law to also explain private 
ownership.41 The solution to the problem, according to Locke, was that “every 
Man has a ‘Property’ in his own ‘Person’. Where a person mixes his own 
labour with something which had previously been in the commons, the thing 
becomes his property”.42 
Locke placed two provisos on the justification of a property right based on 
labour. The first one is that “enough and as good [must be] left in the commons 
34 Rose (1986) U Chi L Rev 722
35 723
36 711-781  Also see Rose (2003) Law & Contemp Probs 93-100
37 J Locke Second Treatise of Government (1690 GW Gough (ed) 1976) ch V para 27
38 See T Ciro “The Scarcity of Intellectual Property” (2005) 1 JILT 1 3
39 F Mostert “The Development of the Natural-law Principle as One of the Principles Underlying the 
Recognition of Intellectual Property – A Historical Survey from Roman Law to Modern-day Law” (1987) 
104 SALJ 480 494-495
40 Locke Second Treatise ch V para 25
41 P Drahos A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (1996) 42  Also see SR Munzer A Theory of Property 
(1990) 254-291
42 Locke Second Treatise ch V para 27  See Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 43  Also see J 
Hughes “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property” (1988) 77 Geo LJ 287 297, where he states that Locke’s 
discussion begins with the description of “a state of nature in which goods are held in common through a 
grant from God … The individual must convert these goods into private property by exerting labor upon 
them  This labor adds value to the goods, if in no other way than by allowing them to be enjoyed by a 
human being”
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for others”.43 This is often interpreted to mean that “[a]s long as one does 
not worsen another’s position by appropriating an object, no objection can be 
raised to owning that with which one mixes one’s labor”.44 Hettinger45 argues 
that patent law does not honour this proviso, since the original inventor is 
granted the exclusive right to manufacture, utilise and sell the creation. He 
further points out that independent inventors who come up with the same 
invention suffer a great loss, since they are not even permitted to use their own 
invention. Hughes states that the “enough and as good as” condition is usually 
understood as descriptive of the commons.46
Locke’s47 second proviso to the labour theory pertains to the prevention of 
spoilage. According to Locke, one must not take more than one is able to use. 
Hettinger48 argues that intellectual property will never be able to meet this 
proviso entirely, since intellectual property is nonexclusive. He states that the 
benefit of the products would determine how wasteful it is for the owner of 
intellectual property to prohibit other persons’ use of the creation. Here it is 
necessary to add the qualification that the intellectual property rights granted 
by statutes do not have the purpose of granting exclusive use rights, but rather 
the exclusive right to prohibit third persons from doing certain acts with the 
work. For example, the copyright in a book does not give the exclusive right 
to read the book. Anyone who is willing to buy the book or prepared to pay 
a fee to read an electronic copy is allowed to read it. It is only when third 
persons wish to copy and distribute the book that copyright becomes relevant. 
Copyright grants the holder the negative right of preventing third persons 
from copying and distributing the book and taking away the remuneration 
to which the copyright holder is entitled. In the context of copyright, it is 
not exclusive personal use and enjoyment of the product that is protected, 
but rather the right to exploit the product that is reserved exclusively for the 
copyright owner. These property rights may be justified by the labour theory 
without contravening the two provisos.
Locke49 implies that the common stock of mankind is increased by granting 
property to people who created things by their own labour. The obvious 
problem with this justification is that the common stock is not increased as 
long as the new wealth remains the property of the labourer, but if anyone 
could appropriate the new wealth there would be no motivation for the 
labourer to create new wealth that might increase the common stock.50 These 
two goals need to be balanced; an example would be the way that the idea/
expression dichotomy aims to balance the need to reward creators with the 
43 Locke Second Treatise ch V para 27
44 EC Hettinger “Justifying Intellectual Property” (1989) 18 Phil & Pub Affairs 31 44  Also see Drahos 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property 42-43
45 Hettinger (1989) Phil & Pub Affairs 44
46 Hughes (1988) Geo LJ 297
47 Locke Second Treatise ch V para 27
48 Hettinger (1989) Phil & Pub Affairs 44-45
49 Locke Second Treatise ch V para 27
50 Hughes (1988) Geo LJ 299
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need to have free access to ideas.51 Hettinger52 describes intellectual products 
as “fundamentally social products”, since creators rely strongly on information 
that already exists in order to create something new. The first argument is that 
if a labourer should be entitled to the market value of the intellectual product 
he created, this value should be distributed among all the contributors. There 
is no logical reason why the last contributor should be entitled to the full value 
and therefore the market value could be of little assistance in determining 
the value of a creator’s contribution. Furthermore, the market value is greatly 
dependent upon different social factors. As a consequence, the argument that 
full market value in the form of property rights should be conferred because 
of own labour would fail. It is a myth that a labourer has a natural right to 
receive the full market value of the creation.53 
Nozick,54 on the other hand, views the state as an invention; the main 
purpose of which is to protect property rights and therefore the state should 
not interfere with those rights.55 Drahos56 cautions that this sort of theoretical 
approach may lead to the conclusion that intellectual property rights should 
be held in perpetuity and any instances where the duration of intellectual 
property is limited by way of statute or where compulsory licenses are 
introduced would constitute “theft” of the intellectual property.57 This would 
be a radical result. One has to keep in mind that the historical tradition of 
natural property rights does not establish the sanctity of property rights; they 
remain a phenomenon that is subject to regulation.58 The government has the 
power to regulate property, but must do so in line with the purposes of natural 
law, as Locke59 states.
In what he terms “the fable of the commons”,60 Ghosh creates his own 
metaphor to contrast intellectual property with tangible property and the 
51 310-314
52 Hettinger (1989) Phil & Pub Affairs 38
53 36-37
54 R Nozick Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) 174-178  This is probably where the American absolutist 
view of intellectual property originated or was at least strengthened  Similar arguments are being made 
in South African law regarding the view that intellectual property should not be affected negatively by 
legitimate government reforms  For example see OH Dean “The Case for the Recognition of Intellectual 
Property in the Bill of Rights” (1997) 60 THRHR 105  See M Kellerman The Constitutional Property 
Clause and Immaterial Property Interests LLD thesis University of Stellenbosch (2010) ch 5 for a 
discussion of the protection of and limitations on intellectual property in terms of the South African 
constitutional property clause (s 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996)  See also M 
du Bois “Intellectual Property as a Constitutional Property Right: The South African Approach” (2012) 
24 SA Merc LJ 177
55 Here it has to be noted that property rights are not the only rights that the state is required to protect  
The state also has the obligation to protect socio-economic rights, political rights and other fundamental 
rights that are as important as or more important than property rights  This entails a balancing of rights  
For example, see Laugh it Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a 
Sabmark International (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 1 SA 144 (CC) where 
the court was required to balance the right to freedom of expression and the right to property
56 Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 53
57 These situations are foreseen in the constitutional property clause  Statutes such as the ones envisioned 
by Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 53 would be allowed in South African law as long as the 
state complies with the provisions for deprivation and expropriation as set out in the property clause
58 Drahos Philosophy of Intellectual Property 53
59 Locke Second Treatise ch VIII para 120
60 Ghosh (2007) UC Davis L Rev 858
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMONS 39
       
“tragedy of the commons”.61 He explains that if a person using the commons 
of land sees a new piece of land, that person and all the other users of the 
commons want to arrive at the land first. When they arrive, however, they 
still find the same tensions of overuse with which to struggle. By contrast, 
intellectual property is about the voyage and ultimately about exploring new 
areas in order to increase the existing commons. Yet there are also similarities 
between the intellectual commons and the traditional commons, in that both 
emphasise the dilemma of resource management.62 Intellectual property is 
similar to tangible property due to the reality that both these forms create an 
arrangement of rights that determines which uses of a resource are allowed 
and which are not.63
The question that Ghosh attempts to answer is how notions of distributive 
justice should inform management of the commons through the construction 
of intellectual property law. He states that his “fable of the commons” could 
make use of technical, legal and social arrangements to regulate the creative 
and inventive processes. There are two normative principles that could guide 
the process of creating a regulatory system, namely “utilitarianism” and 
“distributive justice”. These correspond to Hardin’s64 notions of “welfare 
maximization” and “morality”. Ghosh argues that these two notions must be 
used together, as alone they do not suffice. However, he is of the opinion that 
Hardin’s jump to morality was somewhat simplistic. He suggests that merely 
defining property rights appropriately and enforcing them accordingly can 
possibly solve the problem of resource allocation.65
“Distributive justice” as a normative guide should be applied instead of 
wealth maximisation when defining these property rights. The problems 
standing in the way of the application of wealth maximisation are progress 
and markets respectively, so Ghosh submits. The notion of wealth 
maximisation can only determine that the commons should grow in line with 
progress, but not how that growth should take place. The basic problem of 
who should benefit from the progress is not answered by the notion of wealth 
maximisation. Merely allocating the resource to the highest bidder does not 
take notions of justice into account. Somewhere, “distributive justice” also 
needs to feature in designing a system to regulate the intellectual commons. 
Ghosh uses the example of the inventor of a new drug and asks how this 
new resource should be distributed between the inventor and persons who 
suffer from a life-threatening disease that could be cured by such drug. If the 
ill person is prepared to pay any amount because his life is at stake and the 
inventor is prepared to accept an amount that covers his expenses for creating 
the drug and some return on the investment, there is no problem. However, 
if the inventor wants more than the ill person is willing and able to pay, the 
61 Hardin (1968) Science 1243
62 Ghosh (2007) UC Davis L Rev 861
63 863
64 Hardin (1968) Science 1243-1248
65 Ghosh (2007) UC Davis L Rev 864-866
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welfare maximisation theory alone does not suffice. The structure of markets 
also determines how wealth is defined and allocated.66
Ghosh proposes that intellectual property should be considered in terms of 
three distributional concerns, namely distribution among creators; distribution 
among creators and users; and intergenerational distribution.67 In the context 
of intellectual property, goals of distributive justice may override claims that 
are based merely on welfare maximisation or wealth goals. The question must 
also be asked whether it is possible to decide these two concerns separately. 
The first distributional concern is distribution among creators.68 Originality 
and full appropriability are the two intellectual property principles that 
determine how effort and talent of creators are rewarded. Works that are 
fully original, in other words created without using anything from the public 
domain, may be rewarded by the full social value of the work according to 
efficiency grounds. Ghosh levels some criticisms against this approach. His 
first objection is that partial appropriation would be more efficient as long 
as it is more profitable than alternative uses of the creator’s time. Secondly, 
full appropriablility would also undermine the market. He argues that full 
appropriability is therefore neither efficient nor just. Ghosh also states that 
originality is a strained concept because so much borrowing takes place 
during creation. The myth of the romantic author ignores the social context 
of creation. Requiring a clear author or set of authors for originality is not an 
argument of distributive justice, but rather one for efficient administration.
The second distributional concern is between creators and users69 and this 
conflict is generally resolved by means of the market. Issues here relate to full 
appropriability and originality; the tension between willingness and ability to 
pay; and the problem of pricing. A supplier would not normally claim the full 
price of the product supplied, but merely the production and distribution costs. 
In the case of pharmaceuticals, the market mechanisms would also not ensure 
equitable distribution. There are two reasons why the price mechanism might 
not work in intellectual property markets. Although an intellectual property 
right is not meant to confer a market monopoly, substitutes for a product may 
not be homogenous as required for perfectly competitive markets. Quality 
of the product and other characteristics may be as relevant as the price. 
Furthermore, intellectual property markets do not only concern the transfer 
of goods and services, but also the licensing of rights, which may not lead to 
the most efficient or desirable distribution.
Intergenerational justice70 is the third distributional concern and Ghosh argues 
that progress should be understood through this concept. Intergenerational 
justice in the form of changed technologies, markets and values influences 
the intellectual commons. Intellectual property rules need to be adapted in 
accordance with changed circumstances. A practical example of how the 
66 867-870
67 866-870
68 871-876
69 876-879
70 879-880
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law distributes resources for creative activity is fair use,71 which allows for 
copyright infringement to be justified under certain circumstances. Market 
failure is normally used as the theoretical basis allowing for fair use, usually 
under circumstances where licensing is not appropriate or feasible to allow the 
particular use. Ghosh concludes that there is nothing futile or inevitable about 
the intellectual property commons as envisioned by Hardin’s conception of the 
commons. The only “tragedy” would be to ignore the distributional concerns. 
The three distributional concerns set out by Ghosh provide some guidelines to 
determine when and why particular resources should be categorised as part of 
the commons, which may also be relevant to South African intellectual property 
policy and law.
Although not written specifically in the context of the intellectual commons, 
Gray’s72 formulation of the notion of particularly “moral non-excludability” 
also expounds the reasons why it is imperative for certain resources to remain 
in the commons, which is informative in the enquiry into the importance of the 
commons and helpful to determine when a particular resource should remain 
in or revert to the commons. The explanation of what he terms “excludability” 
sets out three grounds on which a resource may be deemed non-excludable, 
namely physical, legal and moral. Physical non-excludability entails that it is 
impossible or impractical for an owner of a particular resource to exclude third 
persons from the resource and for this reason the resource may not be classified 
as private property. Legal non-excludability envisions the instance where 
there is some form of legal protection available to the owner of a resource, 
which he failed to utilise and for this reason the courts will not protect the 
resource as property. The third form of non-excludability, which is the most 
important one for purposes of this article, relates to moral non-excludability. 
This refers to the situation where it is so important for a particular resource 
to remain in the commons that it would be against public morals to remove it 
from the commons by propertising it. As Gray so eloquently explains it:
“The notion of moral non-excludability derives from the fact that there are certain resources which 
are simply perceived to be so central or intrinsic to constructive human coexistence that it would 
be severely anti-social that these resources should be removed from the commons. To propertise 
resources of such social vitality is contra bonos mores: the resources in question are non-excludable 
because it is widely recognised that undesirable or intolerable consequences would flow from 
allowing any one person or group of persons to control access to the benefits which they confer. 
Following such an appropriation, there would not, in Locke’s well known phrase, be ‘enough and as 
good left in the common for others’ … It is in the definition of moral non-excludables that the law of 
property most closely approaches the law of human rights.”73
The exclusion of certain resources from the property concept on moral 
grounds recognises that there are certain human rights that are superior to any 
“property” claims. Certain freedoms of speech, belief, association, assembly 
and movement are frequently viewed as values higher than the property 
concept:
71 881-883
72 Gray (1991) Cambridge LJ 268-283
73 280-281
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“Here emerges again the important point that property rights are merely prima facie rights which may 
be abridged or overridden by other moral concerns.”74
Although not specifically written about intellectual property, but rather 
about property in general, these statements are no less true for intellectual 
property than for tangible property. Where for example legislation is changed 
to include resources which were previously in the commons, this threatens the 
existence and quality of the commons and may affect human rights negatively.
3  The second enclosure and the public domain
In his article on the second enclosure movement and the public domain, 
Boyle describes the enclosure of common land, where the argument had been 
that private property would be better conserved by an individual owner than 
a commons would be protected by users sharing a resource.75 Unlike with the 
suggestions put forward by Ghosh, which focus on resource allocation during 
the propertisation process, Boyle focuses on the enclosure process, how to 
prevent it and why such prevention is necessary at all if private property is 
more efficient. Boyle states that the historical enclosure of common land is 
relevant to intellectual property, since there is a second enclosure movement 
taking place at the moment. He calls this “the enclosure of the intangible 
commons of the mind”76 in terms of which things that were formerly regarded 
as being either common property or uncommodifiable are being added to the 
property regime. This is done by either granting new intellectual property 
rights or extending existing rights. Boyle refers to the example of the human 
genome to illustrate this tendency. He states that supporters of the enclosure 
movement would reason that patents should be granted to cover human genes. 
Only with the guarantee of property rights would there be investment in the 
production of drugs and gene therapies. In other words: private property saves 
lives. By contrast, persons opposing the enclosure movement would argue 
that the human genome is part of the “common heritage of mankind” and that 
it should and can therefore not be owned. Additionally, innovation may be 
slowed down by the state’s granting of monopolies to a few entities.77
The most interesting example of inconsistent application of the “common 
heritage of mankind” concept is the decision in Moore v Regents of University 
of California,78 a California Supreme Court case where it was decided that 
Moore did not have a property interest in the cells derived from his own 
spleen. The court found that the process in terms of which researchers 
share cell lines would be slowed down if private property rights were to be 
granted to “sources”. However, the doctors who invented the billion-dollar 
cell line from Moore’s spleen were granted a patent which could similarly 
slow down the sharing of knowledge. This was justified by the court on the 
74 283
75 Boyle (2003) Law & Contemp Probs 33-36  Also see Boyle The Public Domain 42-53; More Utopia 32; 
Yelling Common Field and Enclosure  Compare Rose (2003) Law & Contemp Probs 75
76 Boyle (2003) Law & Contemp Probs 36-37  Also see Boyle The Public Domain 42-53
77 Boyle (2003) Law & Contemp Probs 37  Also see Boyle The Public Domain 42-53
78 51 Cal 3d 12; 271 Cal Rptr 146; 793 P2d 479 1991
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strength that in the latter case property rights are a necessary incentive to 
encourage research.79 Boyle adds that the human genome is not the only area 
being enclosed through the expansion of intellectual property rights; other 
examples include business method patents and trademark antidilution rulings 
in the American courts. The limits formerly imposed on intellectual property 
by the public domain are hence steadily being eroded. The point of departure 
regarding intellectual property has always been that intellectual property 
rights are the exception and not the norm, since their effect is so restrictive. 
Boyle correctly argues that the point of departure should still be that ideas 
and facts should not be propertised, but should remain in the public domain.80
This concept has recently been questioned extensively. In the United States 
of America, patents are being stretched to cover ideas that were formerly not 
patentable.81 There have also been attempts to grant property rights over mere 
compilations of facts, which Boyle argues is even more troubling.82 One of 
the goals of intellectual property has always been to protect the commons 
to ensure access to materials. More recently the goal of intellectual property 
(visibly so in United States law) seems to be that there should be as much 
private property as possible. The assumption appears to be that any commons 
is wasteful or uneconomical in the sense that Hardin83 described the commons 
as “tragic”. The ultimate question posed by Boyle is:
“How much of the intangible commons must we enclose [in order to ensure continued production of 
intellectual products]?”84
4  The public domain or intangible commons
MacQueen and Waelde define the concept of the “public domain” in the 
cultural and scientific context as “a body of knowledge and information to 
which there is general access for use for purposes such as education (formal 
and informal) and the further development of knowledge, understanding, 
creativity and inventiveness”.85 It is important to have a well-stocked public 
domain in order for innovation to continue in the cultural and scientific areas. 
This is at least as important as the incentive created by intellectual property’s 
reward of exclusivity and financial return. Both of these methods have the 
same goal, namely to encourage and enable ongoing innovation. Therefore 
it is equally important to define the public domain and determine what is 
required to guarantee its continued existence and to promote the growth and 
79 Boyle (2003) Law & Contemp Probs 37-38  Also see Boyle The Public Domain 42-53
80 Boyle (2003) Law & Contemp Probs 38-39  Also see Boyle The Public Domain 42-53
81 Boyle (2003) Law & Contemp Probs 39  An example is the so-called “business method” patents, which 
cover such “inventions” as auctions or accounting methods; State St Bank & Trust Co v Signature Fin 
Group Inc 149 F3d 1368, 1373 (Fed Cir 1998)
82 Boyle (2003) Law & Contemp Probs 39  See the United States Collection of Information Antipiracy Act S 
2291 105th Cong (1998); Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996 HR 3531 
104th Cong (1996)
83 Hardin (1968) Science 1243-1248
84 Boyle (2003) Law & Contemp Probs 39-40  Also see Boyle The Public Domain 42-53
85 H MacQueen & C Waelde “Introduction: The Many Faces of the Public Domain” in C Waelde & H 
MacQueen (eds) Intellectual Property: The Many Faces of the Public Domain (2007) xi xi
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enforcement of intellectual property rights.86 MacQueen and Waelde depart 
from the point where the public domain is perceived by lawyers as the opposite 
of property. However, they caution that this has the potential to be a serious 
over-simplification. They warn that “free use” does not automatically mean 
“use for free”.87
“Free is often better understood as in free speech (or indeed, freedom) rather than as in free beer.”88
In other words, works should be freely accessible, even though some fee 
may have to be paid for such access.
Boyle89 explores this concept of “free”. He asks whether “free” means:
“Free trade in expression and innovation as opposed to monopoly? Free access to expression and 
innovation, as opposed to access for pay? Or free to innovation and expression, in the sense of not 
being subject to the right of another person to pick and choose who is given access, even if all have to 
pay some flat fee? Or is it common ownership and control that we seek, including the communal right 
to forbid certain kinds of uses of the shared resources?”90
What the public domain means depends on “why we care about the public 
domain, on what vision of freedom or creativity we think the public domain 
stands for, and what danger it protects against”.91 The answer is that there is 
not only one public domain, but different versions thereof. The “commons” 
has frequently been used to refer to origins of creation that are outside of the 
intellectual property regime.92
The question whether the public domain is a right or a liberty deserves 
some exploration. If the public domain can be described as a right, this will 
strengthen its position substantially. If the public at large have vested rights in 
the public domain, this strengthens the arguments brought against limiting the 
public domain by means of private contracts.93 According to the structure of 
rights set out by Hohfeld,94 every right has a corresponding duty. A privilege, 
on the other hand, imposes no correlative duty and as such there is no right. If 
this analysis is applied to the public domain, there has to be a corresponding 
duty on some person in order for there to be a right to the public domain. 
This would lead to the conclusion that individuals have a mere privilege to 
use objects in the public domain. When examining the statutory exceptions 
to intellectual property infringement, it appears that these are also privileges 
86 xii
87 xiii-xiv
88 As put by Richard Stalman – see R Stalman “What is Free Software?” (28-02-13) GNU Operating System 
<http:/www gnu org/philosophy/free-sw html> (accessed 19-03-2013)
89 Boyle (2003) Law & Contemp Probs 62
90 62
91 62
92 62  See Gray (1991) Cambridge LJ 268-276 on excludability and specifically moral non-excludability
93 J Cahir “The Public Domain: Right or Liberty?” in C Waelde & H MacQueen (eds) Intellectual Property: 
The Many Faces of the Public Domain (2007) 35 35
94 Published in two articles: W Hohfeld “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale LJ 16 and W Hohfeld “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning” (1916) 26 Yale LJ 710
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and not rights.95 However, in South African law, there are arguments that 
these should be treated as rights.96
The same arguments regarding the intellectual commons are relevant for 
both copyright and patents. However, it is useful to examine some practical 
examples in order to demonstrate the importance of a vibrant, well-stocked 
intellectual commons to the continued production of valuable new intellectual 
works. Specifically in the context of copyright the public domain may be 
defined to include all literary and artistic works of which the term of protection 
has expired and which as such are no longer protected by copyright or other 
rights. At the end of such a term of protection, the work may be freely used, 
since it falls in the public domain. Once a work falls in the public domain, 
permission is no longer required to use the work and no remuneration need be 
paid. Furthermore, the work is no longer protected by the Universal Copyright 
Convention,97 which acknowledges the public domain. A work would also fall 
in the public domain if it did not qualify for copyright protection in the first 
place, for instance if the work lacked originality or did not comply with one 
of the other requirements for the subsistence of copyright.98 The option of a 
paying public domain is a different definition of the public domain, which 
entails royalties being collected after the expiry of a work’s copyright term. 
These royalties payments, generally perceived as a form of tax,99 would then 
be used for the benefit of living authors or for other cultural purposes.
According to Deazley, an understanding of the public domain for copyright 
needs to distinguish clearly between the two connected concepts of “access to” 
and “use of” a work. Copyright confers a bundle of rights upon the owner of 
the work, who is then able to prevent other parties from using the work without 
his permission. The public domain in the context of copyright accordingly 
allows use of a work without permission. The second consideration is that 
once a work is published, it enters a public space. This aspect refers to the 
work being accessible to the public; hence the owner is no longer the only 
person with control over access to the work as was the case before the work 
was published. The intellectual commons consists of two separate types of 
works, namely those protected by copyright and those falling in the public 
domain. These works would not fall into the intellectual commons until they 
are disclosed by being made available to the public through publishing.100 
These first distinctions are too simplistic, since the public domain must also 
95 Cahir “Public Domain” in Intellectual Property 39-40
96 See Pistorius “Copyright Law” in Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 211-212 where she submits 
that the copyright exceptions should be construed as rights
97 United Nations Universal Copyright Convention (1952) 216 UNTS 132; 943 UNTS 194 <http://
portal unesco org/en/ev php-URL_ID=15381&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201 html> 
(accessed 26-07-2012)  Art 7 states that “[t]his Convention shall not apply to works or rights in works 
which, at the effective date of the Convention in a Contracting State where protection is claimed, are 
permanently in the public domain in the said Contracting State”  South Africa has not ratified this 
convention
98 G Davies “The Public Interest in the Public Domain” in C Waelde & H MacQueen (eds) Intellectual 
Property: The Many Faces of the Public Domain (2007) 86 86
99 91-92
100 R Deazley “Copyright’s Public Domain” in C Waelde & H MacQueen (eds) Intellectual Property: The 
Many Faces of the Public Domain (2007) 21 22-24
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include aspects of copyright works where permission is not required to use 
the work. This would be the case with the ideas within a copyright work. 
Such ideas are not protected by copyright and as a result may be used without 
prior consent of the copyright owner. The use exceptions, as set out in the 
Copyright Act 98 of 1978, would also fall into this category, even though they 
are for specific purposes and subject to certain conditions.101
The Copyright Act governs the law of copyright in South Africa. Certain 
conditions must be met before copyright protection will subsist in a work. 
There must be an eligible “work”102 and a “qualified person”.103 Furthermore, 
the work must be original104 and must exist in a material form.105 Propriety 
of the work is also required and this is the only remaining common law 
requirement.106 The Copyright Act prescribes no formalities for the acquisition 
of copyright in a work. Copyright comes into existence automatically, 
provided a work meets these specified conditions. The Copyright Act sets out 
certain statutory fair use exceptions where prior permission is not required 
to use the work. Dean107 states that these exceptions are instances where it is 
considered to be in the public interest that the owner of the copyright should 
not have a monopoly where the performance of certain acts in relation to the 
copyright work is concerned. According to Dean these exceptions are based 
on the assumption that a copyright infringement has transpired and that this 
infringement is excused by virtue of the exemption.108 Pistorius109 disagrees 
with this view, maintaining that fair dealing is a right rather than a defence. She 
mentions that “[t]he general purpose of copyright exceptions and limitations 
is to balance the public’s right to access copyright works and the economic 
rights of copyright owners”. This seems fair and corresponds exactly with the 
general purpose of the public domain in the sense that intellectual property 
rights should be construed and developed in such a way that intellectual 
property works would still be readily accessible to the public and available for 
future creative use.
The first exception in the Copyright Act is the fair dealing exception:
101 24-25
102 S 2(1) of the Copyright Act  See Dean Copyright Law 1-6–1-20; Pistorius “Copyright Law” in Law of 
Intellectual Property in South Africa 155-160; M von Seidel Intellectual Property: The John & Kernick 
Guide (1998) 73-75 on the works eligible for copyright protection under the Copyright Act
103 S 3(1) of the Copyright Act  Also see Dean Copyright Law 1-28; Pistorius “Copyright Law” in Law of 
Intellectual Property in South Africa 165-166; Von Seidel Intellectual Property 75 on the concept of a 
qualified person
104 S 2 of the Copyright Act  Also see Dean Copyright Law 1-21–1-24; Pistorius “Copyright Law” in Law of 
Intellectual Property in South Africa 162-164; Von Seidel Intellectual Property 75 on the requirement of 
originality
105 S 2(2) of the Copyright Act  Also see Dean Copyright Law 1-24–1-27; Pistorius “Copyright Law” in Law 
of Intellectual Property in South Africa 164; Von Seidel Intellectual Property 75 on the requirement of 
material form
106 See Pistorius “Copyright Law” in Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 168-170 which sets out 
the history of this requirement and the widely differing opinions on how this requirement should be 
interpreted
107 Dean Copyright Law 1-92  Pistorius “Copyright Law” in Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 211 
agrees that the exceptions curtail a copyright owner’s monopoly on the exploitation of a work
108 Dean Copyright Law 1-92
109 Pistorius “Copyright Law” in Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 211-212
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMONS 47
       
“Any fair dealing with a literary, musical or artistic work, or with a broadcast or published edition, 
does not infringe that copyright when it is –
a)  for the purposes of research or private study by, or the personal private use of, the person using 
the work;
b)  for the purposes of criticism or review of that work or of another work; or
c)  for the purposes of reporting current events –
 i)  in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical; or
 ii) by means of broadcasting or in a cinematographic film.”110
The exceptions relating to criticism or review; and the reporting of current 
events111 also apply to cinematographic films, sound recordings and computer 
programs. Where a work deals fairly for the purposes of criticism or review; or 
for reporting current events in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical,112 
it must be accompanied by an appropriate acknowledgement.113 Specifically, 
the source of the work as well as the name of the author (if it appears on the 
work) must be mentioned. “Fair dealing” is a rather vague concept, possibly 
in order to enable the court to take all circumstances into consideration when 
deciding whether an infringement may be excused.114 There are a number 
of further exceptions that will not be discussed at length for the purposes of 
this section. The purpose is merely to give a number of examples from South 
African copyright law where certain aspects of copyright works would fall in 
the public domain.115 The purpose of these exceptions appears to be in line 
with the reasons that Gray116 furnishes for certain resources being morally 
non-excludable, in other words it would be against public policy to propertise 
these aspects of copyright works. From copyright it may be seen that there are 
at least three different scenarios where the public domain is relevant, namely 
where the copyright term has expired and the entire work falls into the public 
domain; where ideas embodied within the work remain outside of copyright 
and thus in the public domain; and where certain acts are exempted from 
infringement by the Copyright Act by reason of the public interest. This may 
also include instances where other fundamental rights may be considered more 
important than copyright, for example freedom of expression or the right to 
education.117 It becomes apparent that the public domain is vitally important 
to the continued production of intellectual products and it must be protected 
from enclosure that may possibly be effected by extensions of copyright terms 
and inclusion of materials and ideas that are currently not copyrightable. The 
same is true for the public domain relating to patents.
110 S 12(1) of the Copyright Act
111 Ss 12(1)(b) and (c)
112 Ss 12(1)(b) and (c)(i)
113 Ss 15(4), 16, 17, 18 and 19B
114 Dean Copyright Law 1-92–1-94  Also see Pistorius “Copyright Law” in Law of Intellectual Property in 
South Africa 212-213 on the concept of fair dealing
115 Further exceptions set out in s 12 of the Copyright Act include quotations (s 12(3)), illustrations for 
teaching (s 12(4)), ephemeral copies (s 12(5)) and reverse engineering of products (s 15(3))  See further 
Dean Copyright Law 1-92–1-109; Pistorius “Copyright Law” in Law of Intellectual Property in South 
Africa 211-222 on the exceptions to copyright infringement
116 Gray (1991) Cambridge LJ 280-281
117 S 16 (the right to freedom of expression) and s 29 (the right to education) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996  Although there has been no such case in South African law specifically 
regarding copyright, see BVerfGE 31, 229 [1971] (“Urheberrecht case”) (“the Schoolbook case”), a 
German case dealing with copyright and education
48 STELL LR 2013 1
       
The Patents Act 57 of 1978 governs the registration of patents in South 
Africa.118 A patent grants, among others, the exclusive right to make, use or 
import products embodying the invention.119 The term of a patent is twenty 
years from the date of application.120 A patent granted in South Africa is valid 
throughout the whole of South Africa for this limited period.121 Once the 
term has expired, the invention falls within the public domain or intellectual 
property commons and the public is free to make use of the invention, very 
similar to copyright works. In the case of patents for medicines, this implies 
that generic substitutes for the medicines may be placed on the market. The 
original medicine is no longer protected by the patent and the technology falls 
within the intellectual commons.122 The term of a patent limits the extent of 
the right granted, as such patent rights are not absolute. There are also certain 
situations where inventions are excluded from patentability and these also 
serve to limit rights.
The Patents Act describes which inventions are patentable.123 A patent 
may be granted for a new invention that involves an inventive step and is 
capable of being used in trade, industry or agriculture. The Patents Act also 
names specific exclusions from the concept of an invention for purposes of 
patents. These are a discovery; a scientific theory; a mathematical method; 
a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other aesthetic work; a 
scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act, playing a game or doing 
business; a program for a computer; or the presentation of information.124 The 
Patents Act names further exclusions from patentability, namely inventions 
which promote offensive or immoral behaviour;125 and any variety of animal 
or plant, or any essentially biological process for the production of animals or 
plants that is not a microbiological process.126 In some instances, the purpose 
of these exclusions appears to be that certain general information should 
remain in the public domain to be readily available for future inventions and 
should therefore not be propertised. Other exclusions are aimed at preventing 
immoral gains or exploitation or to exclude interests not suitable for patent 
protection, although they could be protected in other forms. These examples 
of exclusions and the reasons for them correspond loosely to Gray’s moral non-
excludability explanation.127 There are also specific fundamental rights that 
118 See Von Seidel Intellectual Property 15-30 for a basic overview of patents
119 W Alberts “What is Intellectual Property?” (2007) De Rebus 45 45  See s 25 of the Patents Act and Burrell 
Patent and Design Law 1-22–1-26
120 S 46(1) of the Patents Act  See Burrell Patent and Design Law 1-3; Van der Merwe “The Law of Patents” 
in Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 298; Von Seidel Intellectual Property 27
121 Burrell Patent and Design Law 1-4
122 Alberts (2007) De Rebus 45  See Burrell Patent and Design Law 1-1  See further Letraset Ltd v Helios Ltd 
1972 3 SA 245 (A) 249 where the court stated that a patent involves a quid pro quo where the quid is the 
monopoly conferred on the inventor while the quo is the new knowledge that the public may use freely 
after the patent has expired
123 S 25(1) of the Patents Act
124 S 25(2)(a)-(g) of the Patents Act  See Burrell Patent and Design Law 1-24  S 25(3) states that “[t]he 
provisions of subsection (2) shall prevent, only to the extent to which a patent or an application for a patent 
relates to that thing as such, anything from being treated as an invention for the purposes of this Act”
125 S 25(4)(a)
126 S 25(4)(b)
127 Gray (1991) Cambridge LJ 280-281
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may be affected by the recognition of property rights in patents. The granting 
of “patents on life” may restrict access to new biological discoveries and their 
applications, which in turn may limit the acquisition of new knowledge. The 
public domain of knowledge about human, animal and plant128 biology is 
changing shape entirely in the United States. Preference is being given to 
knowledge which may be patented and that which is communal is neglected, 
which may lead to damaging effects, particularly in developing countries.129 
Without the protection of intellectual property, companies will be unwilling 
to invest in developing a product for fear that other companies will copy the 
product.130 Even though patents are mainly used to prevent the imitation of 
inventions and to secure markets, patenting has increasingly been driven 
by other motivations. These include “blocking competitors; increasing the 
company’s reputation and value; exchanging value with partners, licensees 
and investors; and controlling internal performance and motivations”.131 
Patent holders may prevent other companies from using the particular, 
patented knowledge. Subsequently, these competitors are also barred from 
using the knowledge to make improvements on a particular product and from 
selling it in competition with the holder of that patent. In this sense knowledge 
is not non-rivalrous, as the use of intellectual products is usually described.
From this discussion, it becomes clear that there are at least two categories 
of patent-related aspects of intellectual creations that are relevant to the 
intellectual commons, namely where the term of a patent has expired and 
the creation reverts back to the commons; and where specific aspects are 
excluded from patentability by virtue of legislation, because they are deemed 
too commonplace or because patenting the specific aspect would be immoral. 
This would also include the cases where another fundamental right is deemed 
more important than a particular patent right.
A final, particularly problematic aspect of the public domain that requires 
attention is the interaction between the public domain and traditional 
knowledge.132 In contrast with copyright and patents that are already protected by 
property rights and where the danger lies in the encroaching of new or stronger 
property rights into the public domain, traditional knowledge is not yet generally 
128 In South African law, the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 15 of 1976 provides for the protection of new plant 
varieties, therefore these are not protected under the category of patents  See DW Collier “Access to and 
Control over Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture in South and Southern Africa: How Many 
Wrongs Before a Right?’ (2006) 7 MJLST 529 in general; P van der Spuy “Plant Breeders’ Rights” in HB 
Klopper, T Pistorius, B Rutherford, L Tong, P van der Spuy & A van der Merwe (co-ordinating ed) Law 
of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2011) 337 in general
129 H Wallace & S Mayer “Scientific Research Agendas: Controlled and Shaped by the Scope of Patentability” 
in C Waelde & H MacQueen (eds) Intellectual Property: The Many Faces of the Public Domain (2007) 
189
130 191
131 197
132 SR Munzer & K Raustiala “The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge” 
(2009) 27 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 37 48 explain as follows:
“Traditional knowledge, more fully and carefully defined, is understanding or skill, which is typically 
possessed by indigenous peoples and whose existence typically predates colonial contact (typically 
with the West), that relates to medical remedies, plant and animal products, technologies, and 
cultural expressions  The term ‘cultural expressions’ includes religious rituals, sacred objects, rites of 
passage, songs, dances, myths, stories, and folklore generally  These forms of knowledge and cultural 
expressions are rarely frozen in time  Generally they evolve over decades and centuries ”
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protected by property rights. Therefore the issues relating to the public domain 
are quite different for traditional knowledge in that traditional knowledge has 
always been exploited since it is considered part of the public domain. This link 
between traditional knowledge and the public domain has been explored by 
Gibson, who submits that historically, the appropriation of traditional knowledge 
by colonisers has been justified by the doctrine of discovery. The traditional 
knowledge was regarded as “natural” or as part of the global heritage of humanity 
and as a consequence it was there for the benefit of all. This formed an important 
aspect of the imperialist process, in terms of which colonised peoples’ culture and 
knowledge were dominated by the “superior” knowledge of the coloniser. In the 
current debate relating to the expansion of intellectual property rights, traditional 
knowledge is still treated as part of a common heritage instead of creative 
knowledge of the indigenous communities, according to Gibson.133
More recently, on an international level, there have been calls for the 
protection of traditional knowledge as property as an integral part of the unity 
and dignity of indigenous communities. The position of traditional knowledge 
within the public domain as defined by modern intellectual property law is a 
very important aspect of the debate about the expansion of intellectual property 
rights. Currently, this construction of traditional knowledge as part of the 
public domain still enables the appropriation of traditional knowledge. This 
leads to arguments to the effect that access to traditional knowledge cannot 
be denied, because it is legally or morally impossible. The public domain is 
used by groups with commercial interests to gain access to these resources. 
Absurdly, these commercially interested groups sometimes argue that 
traditional communities are attempting to expand intellectual property rights 
by seeking to protect their traditional knowledge.134 Therefore it appears that 
the two separate debates about the expansion of intellectual property rights 
and the protection of traditional knowledge sometimes get confused. The 
way in which traditional knowledge is construed as part of the international 
public domain does not account for cultural and political identity linked to 
the traditional knowledge. This does not consider the creative process that 
leads to the knowledge, which is treated as a mere product to be extracted 
by companies with commercial interests.135 In the context of traditional 
knowledge, the distributive concerns considered by Ghosh136 can be applied 
CJ Visser “Making Intellectual Property Laws Work for Traditional Knowledge” in JM Finger & P 
Schuler (eds) Poor People’s Knowledge: Promoting Intellectual Property in Developing Countries 
(2004) 207 207 uses a wider definition, including “traditional and tradition-based literary, artistic, 
and scientific works; performances, inventions, scientific discoveries, and designs; marks, names, and 
symbols; undisclosed information; and all other innovations and creations resulting from intellectual 
activity in the industrial, scientific, literary, or artistic fields  So categories of traditional knowledge 
include agricultural knowledge; scientific knowledge; technical knowledge; ecological knowledge; 
medicinal knowledge, including knowledge relating to medicines and remedies; knowledge relating to 
biodiversity; and traditional cultural expressions in the form of music, dance, song, handicrafts, designs, 
stories, artworks, and elements of languages (such as names, geographical indications, and symbols)”
133 J Gibson “Audiences in Tradition: Traditional Knowledge and the Public Domain” in C Waelde & H 
MacQueen (eds) Intellectual Property: The Many Faces of the Public Domain (2007) 174 174
134 175-178
135 178
136 Ghosh (2007) UC Davis L Rev 888-889
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fruitfully, since this is a prime example where justice would not be served by 
merely allocating the resource to the highest bidder.
Traditional knowledge is currently in the process of being integrated into 
the existing intellectual property categories under South African private 
law by way of the so-called Traditional Knowledge Bill.137 Traditional 
knowledge already receives limited protection under patents,138 but all other 
forms of traditional knowledge are still unprotected to date. If the Traditional 
Knowledge Bill139 is passed (possibly an amended version) and the existing 
intellectual property categories are therefore updated to include interests in 
traditional knowledge as intellectual property rights, then these interests would 
be protected as property in South African private law, at least in principle. 
There are valid concerns that this Bill will not adequately protect interests in 
traditional knowledge140 and these have now been noted by the president, who 
sent the original draft Bill141 back to Parliament due to concerns that it may 
be unconstitutional. There have also been calls for sui generis protection of 
traditional knowledge, in other words a separate piece of legislation catering 
exclusively for traditional knowledge rights.142 However, despite the difficulties 
in creating the appropriate kind of protection for traditional knowledge, it is 
clear that South African law does not view traditional knowledge as part of the 
commons; and correctly so. Protection for traditional knowledge should not 
be viewed as a negative development in intellectual property law in the sense 
of encroaching on the commons. Unfortunately, the Traditional Knowledge 
Bill143 is currently the only example of South African intellectual property 
law legislation being revised. Therefore practical application of considering 
the commons while revising South African intellectual property legislation 
would only fully happen if there were calls for the extension of the duration 
137 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill of 2007 (draft) in GG 33055 of 29-03-2010 and GG 31026 of 
05-05-08  As at 22 March 2013: By resolution of the National Assembly adopted on 14 March 2013, the 
Bill has been referred to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry for consideration and report  The 
Bill has also been resubmitted to the JTM for reconsideration of its classification, and is to be referred to 
the National House of Traditional Leaders for comment
138 Amendments to the Patents Act 57 of 1978 (ss 30(3A) and 30(3B)) have been drafted to incorporate 
the requirements of the Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004, in the Patents Amendment Act 20 of 2005 which 
came into force in 2007  These amendments require a patent application to include information about any 
traditional knowledge; or indigenous biological or genetic resource that was used to derive a patent or 
base it on
139 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill of 2007 (draft) in GG 33055 of 29-03-2010 and GG 31026 of 
05-05-08  As at 22 March 2013: By resolution of the National Assembly adopted on 14 March 2013, the 
Bill has been referred to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry for consideration and report  The 
Bill has also been resubmitted to the JTM for reconsideration of its classification, and is to be referred to 
the National House of Traditional Leaders for comment
140 OH Dean “Where Angels Fear to Tread” (2009) Without Prejudice 18-19; OH Dean “Red Card” (2009) 
Without Prejudice 17-20; LTC Harms “A Few Negative Trends in the Field of Intellectual Property 
Rights” (2009) 72 THRHR 175-191
141 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill of 2007 (draft) in GG 33055 of 29-03-2010 and GG 31026 of 
05-05-2008
142 Dean (2009) Without Prejudice 20
143 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill of 2007 (draft) in GG 33055 of 29-03-2010 and GG 31026 of 
05-05-08  As at 22 March 2013: By resolution of the National Assembly adopted on 14 March 2013, the 
Bill has been referred to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry for consideration and report  The 
Bill has also been resubmitted to the JTM for reconsideration of its classification, and is to be referred to 
the National House of Traditional Leaders for comment  
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of intellectual property rights; or if a whole-scale revision of the legislation 
were to take place.
5  Conclusions
The intangible property commons or public domain is of particular 
importance for all categories of intellectual property, as was demonstrated by 
the examples of copyright and patents. Intellectual property rights are already 
protected as property in private law. The problem is that intellectual property 
rights could be expanded to encroach unduly upon the public domain and this 
should be prohibited by allowing any intellectual property right extensions 
only after careful consideration of all the relevant interests. The public 
domain consists of resources that may not be protected in terms of intellectual 
property rights because they are morally non-excludable; works of which 
the intellectual property protection has expired; and aspects of intellectual 
property works that are not covered by property rights (legally non-excludable 
resources). The public interest always has an influence where property rights 
are concerned. In the United States of America there are movements towards 
lengthening the terms of intellectual property protection as well as granting 
of protection to aspects of works that could not previously be covered by 
intellectual property rights.144 In South African law this should be prevented 
and a balance must be found between the protection of private property rights 
and interests in the public domain.145
The public domain should be protected as well as expanded. That which 
is in the commons must be protected from undue propertisation so that it 
is still available for use in future intellectual works. During the creation 
of new intellectual property works, the “raw materials” in the commons 
should be used in such a way that it is still available for other uses as well. 
If the materials are taken out of the commons their use in the creation of 
new intellectual products can no longer be described as “non-rivalrous” and 
the same concerns as with the tangible commons become applicable. The 
expansion of the commons entails that intellectual creations should receive 
property rule-type protection for the minimum length of time necessary to 
ensure a continued incentive for the production of such works, so that these 
works are available as part of the intellectual commons as soon as possible to 
ensure continued creation of intellectual works.
144 See Haggerty (2002) U Cin L Rev 651; Depoorter (2004) V JL & Tech 4; M Perelman “The Weakness in 
Strong Intellectual Property Rights” (2003) 46 Challenge 32
145 See Kellerman The Constitutional Property Clause and Immaterial Property Interests 149-162
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SUMMARY
The intellectual commons or public domain is an important part of intellectual property law 
scholarship. In this regard it is necessary to examine the origins of the commons, what exactly the 
intellectual commons is and how the notion of the intellectual commons may be further developed. 
Especially in the United States of America there are concerns that the intellectual commons is 
currently being enclosed by extending intellectual property protection to areas of intellectual activity 
that were previously excluded from propertisation; and by extending intellectual property protection 
of existing rights. It may be argued that some intellectual products should remain in the commons 
or revert back to the commons in order to ensure that enough remains so that new intellectual 
products may be developed based on these existing products. However, there must also be enough 
of a property-right based incentive in order to ensure continued investment in the creation of new 
intellectual products. The important question is then, how may these two interests be balanced? This 
article examines the issues related to the commons in order to provide a framework which future 
revisions to intellectual property legislation may use as a point of departure to ensure that South 
African legislation does not encroach on the intellectual commons unduly. Examples from copyright 
law, patent law and traditional knowledge are used to demonstrate how the intellectual commons and 
intellectual property statutes interact.
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